Introduction
The launching of Operation Desert Storm against Iraq in 1991 was initiated on the basis of Security Council Resolution 678 of 1990. This action was characterized by agreement amongst various members of the United Nations (UN) and the question of the legality of this operation was not really in dispute.
Subsequent armed attacks by especially the United States of America (USA) and the United Kingdom (UK) against Iraq has resulted in disagreement regarding the legality of these actions.
1
Gross violations of human rights in Kosovo have lead to armed intervention in 1999, which has been coined "humanitarian intervention" by various international lawyers. This concept has also sparked a debate regarding the legality of the notion in terms of international public law. 2 It is frequently asked if this concept complies with the jus ad bellum. 3 The legality of the use of armed force against Afghanistan is also debatable. 4 The disagreement 4/37 constitute collective self-defence. 11 The question accordingly arises whether article 2(4) makes provision for the use of force in instances other than selfdefence and authorization by the Security Council. Is the use of force for humanitarian ends justified? May force therefore be used to prevent or suppress atrocities and massive violations of human rights as in the case of Kosovo? The events that took place in 1998-1999 in Kosovo have placed a great deal of focus on the concept of "humanitarian intervention" and it compelled international lawyers to revisit this notion. 12 This concept has received a great deal of attention and has been the source of a lively debate in the field of international public law. 13 The term "humanitarian intervention" is used where a state or several states use armed force against another state in order to enforce and protect human rights. 14 The UN Charter does not explicitly deal with humanitarian intervention. The fact that the Security
Council has the power to authorize coercive intervention does not mean that this authority is easily invoked. 15 The Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. 16 Article 39 of the UN Charter states that the Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression and it can take measures involving the use of force in response. The effect of article 27(3) of the UN Charter is that a Security Council Resolution to authorize intervention is subject to the consent of any of the five permanent members. A single permanent member can therefore prevent the authorization of humanitarian intervention. 17 The authority also requires an affirmative vote by nine members of the fifteen Council members. This procedure has proved not to be efficacious. 18 An example of this is the It is accordingly important to dissect the various possible justifications that may exist for the usage of force on the basis of humanitarian intervention.
Textual interpretation of article 2(4) of the UN Charter
Certain scholars argue that article 2(4) does not prohibit unilateral force in general, but force against the political independence and territorial integrity of a state or recourse to force inconsistent with the principles of the UN Charter. 20 In terms of this argument the use of force to protect human rights is not directed against the political independence and territorial integrity of a state and it is not inconsistent with the purposes of the Charter as respect for human rights is one of the aims thereof. 21 The use of force is accordingly justified to end atrocities and large-scale deprivation of life and humanitarian intervention does not violate article 2(4). This argument is, however, flawed
and cannot be accepted. 22 The terms "territorial integrity" and "political independence" do not restrict the scope of the prohibition of the use of force and cover any kind of transboundary use of armed force. 
The role of the sovereignty of states
The international legal system has undergone changes since the founding of the UN. State sovereignty was to a great extent the center of attention when the Charter came into force. 25 Article 2(7) contains a reference to the state sovereignty of members of the UN. 26 Reisman 27 is of the opinion that:
None of us who are compelled to ask hard questions about the lawfulness of the Kosovo action is a consistent strict constructionist of the Charter. After all, who amongst us insists on a textual interpretation of article 2(7)? But we are all stricter when it comes to reading article 2(4).
It is accordingly reasoned that the flexible interpretation of article 2(7) has an effect on article 2(4). The basis for this argument is that the defense of domestic jurisdiction in terms of sovereignty cannot be used as an excuse for human rights violations. 28 The right to violate human rights in a gross fashion is therefore removed from the sphere of political independence. It is argued that the UN Charter cannot be changed without resulting in adjustments in other parts of the Charter. The argument furthermore entails that the inefficiency of the procedures of the Security Council results in a lack of action where humanitarian intervention is needed and it is not practical that the council has the exclusive power to decide in these circumstances which course of action must be undertaken. The question accordingly arises whether this argument can find support?
24 A 1(1) of the UN Charter. 25 Charney http://www.asil.org/ajil/kosovo.htm 1 Aug: NATO's Campaign. 26 A 2(7) states that: "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII." 27 Reisman http://www.asil.org/ajil/kosovo.htm 9 Jun. 28 See also Falk http://www.asil.org/ajil/kosovo.htm 7 Jun. It must be kept in mind that in the instance of Kosovo, it was not the UN that intervened in the domestic jurisdiction of another state. The argument is, however, relevant to the question whether a 2(4) has been changed through developments in the interpretation of a 2(7).
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State sovereignty does not entail that a state as a member of the international community is free from certain responsibilities to its own citizens and to other members of the international community. 29 The international dimension to various activities, such as transboundary pollution, has lead to the development of international regulations to ensure the effective management of such issues. 30 This leads to a situation where the notion of sovereignty is changing in those areas, which were considered to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of States. This indeed allows for a more flexible approach regarding the interpretation of article 2(7). It is very important to realize that the acceptance of the flexible approach to sovereignty, does not imply that article 2(4) can be interpreted in a way that permits the use of unilateral armed force for humanitarian reasons. This will render the content of article 2(4) meaningless. Articles 2(7) and 2(4) furthermore differ as article 2(4) is a jus cogens norm whereas article 2 (7) does not have the same status. 37 The fact that article 2(7) has been given content regarding the implication of sovereignty in relation to the other values in the Charter, does not imply that humanitarian intervention in the absence of authorization of the Security Council can be accepted. 38 The fact that a state exercises its sovereignty in a way that does not pay heed to human rights does not warrant illegal unauthorized intervention and a violation of article 2(4).
Humanitarian intervention as an emerging norm of customary law
It has been argued that the use of armed force in Kosovo established the emergence of a new customary rule in favour of humanitarian intervention.
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The obligation of states to respect human rights is an obligation erga omnes and this implies that any state or a collective group of states has the right to take steps, excluding the unilateral use of force, to attain such a respect. 40 In 
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It must furthermore be kept in mind that article 2(4) is a jus cogens norm.
47
This concept was codified in the Vienna Convention. 48 Article 53 states that a treaty shall be void if it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law as a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character. 49 The violation of jus cogens norms is a violation against the international community as a whole and the use of force against one state implies the use of force against all states. It is therefore important to establish if the restrictions of the use of force have been changed by other norms of jus cogens.
A jus cogens norm has the highest hierarchical position among the other norms and principles of international law. Jus cogens norms are peremptory and non-derogable. 50 In order to achieve recognition as jus cogens, a norm must be accepted and recognized as a peremptory norm by the international community of states as a whole as indicated in article 53 of the Vienna Convention. 51 In the light of the importance of the norms in question, such an acceptance and recognition would not be lightly presumed. The fact that article 53 refers to the acceptance and recognition by the international community as a whole is a strict requirement for the creation of a jus cogens norm.
In terms of the wording of article 53 a jus cogens norm can be amended by a norm of the same nature. 
Other justifications for humanitarian intervention
The concept of humanitarian intervention cannot be supported by the existence of a rule of customary international law in this regard. The question may therefore be asked whether the concept of humanitarian intervention can be justified on other grounds. It would be worthwhile to briefly focus on arguments of various scholars in this regard. Schachter is of the opinion that it is undesirable to allow a rule of humanitarian intervention and that it would be better to acquiesce in a violation that is considered necessary and desirable.
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Henkin also follows the same line of reasoning and is of the opinion that the lesson of Kosovo is that states will first act and then challenge the Security Council to terminate the action. 55 A permanent member of the council could by means of a veto ensure that such a resolution is not adopted. The Security
Council will therefore acquiesce in the decision to intervene. 57 Moore identifies two wrong schools of thought on the subject of jus ad bellum. The "supposed realist" school is the group that is of the opinion that international rules are not really enforced and therefore not important. They tend to ignore the importance of international public law and the prohibition against aggression. The "minimalists" do not focus on the illegality of an attack, but rather curtail the right of self-defence through a variety of implausible interpretations of the UN Charter. This group also ignores the importance of the role of law in deterring aggression. 14/37 is supported by the majority of the members. Members must refrain from using their veto right where the national interests of members are not affected.
In the instances where the Security Council refuses a motion for humanitarian intervention this proposal may be taken to the General Assembly or measures may be taken in terms of chapter 8 of the Charter, provided that subsequent authorization will be sought. This principle opens up the possibility for regional organizations to first act in contravention with article 2(4) and then to seek retroactive justification for their actions. This is clearly not an optimal approach and may lead to abuse. Another problem with these grounds and principles for humanitarian intervention is that it may be possible for a powerful state to indicate that the requirements for the justification of humanitarian intervention are met and such a state may then pursue its own self-interest. It is also doubtful whether powerful states will adhere to the proposed grounds and principles in the instance where they pursue self- Council has not adopted a resolution under chapter VII of the Charter to authorize the use of force. 68 The use of armed force in this instance is furthermore clearly not a case of humanitarian intervention. 69 The actions against Afghanistan have accordingly resulted in a debate regarding the legality of these actions. 70 Various authors have engaged in this debate and it would not be meaningful to duplicate these contributions. 71 It would suffice for the purpose of this article to briefly reflect on the effect of these actions in Afghanistan in relation to the jus ad bellum. Afghanistan was therefore in contravention of article 2(4).
Justifications for the attacks against Afghanistan
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The legality of the use of force against Iraq
Authorisation by the Security Council
In order to determine the legality of the recent attacks on Iraq, it must be The general prohibition of force applied again in full and a material breach of the requirements of the cease-fire does not give individual members the right to use armed force without the authorisation of the Security Council.
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The Security Council is the party to the cease-fire and it must decide whether a material breach has occurred regarding the agreement and which type of response is needed. 
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The language of a resolution should be carefully analysed … having regard to the terms of the resolution to be interpreted, the discussions leading to it, the Charter provisions invoked and, in general, all circumstances that might assist in determining the legal consequences.
The Resolution 687. Par 13 refers to the fact that Iraq has been warned of the serious consequences it faces due to the violation of its obligations.
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Iraq is in material breach of its obligations, it is still the Security Council that
needs to decide what the appropriate answer to this breach will be. 103 This resolution, just as the others, therefore does not serve as a legal basis for the attack on Iraq. The USA and UK therefore attacked Iraq without authorisation from the Security Council.
The pre-emptive use of force
The plan to attack Iraq was primarily based on the argument of the USA that Iraq has continued the development of weapons of mass destruction and might use these weapons against opponents or supply these weapons to terrorist networks. 104 The objective was to pre-empt this danger by removing the regime from power. This strategy is therefore based on the concept of pre-emptive self-defence. 105 Is this doctrine in line with article 51 of the UN Charter? In terms of the wording of article 51 the element of armed attack must be present to invoke the notion of self-defence. This is supported by the ruling in the Nicaragua case that the right to self-defence exists only in the instance of an armed attack. 106 The court indicated that an armed attack does not only refer to action by regular forces across an international border, but may also include:
[T]he sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to … an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces.
The Parties in this case did not rely on the issue of a threat of an imminent armed attack and the court therefore did not rule on this issue. 107 The question whether anticipatory self-defence will be lawful was therefore [194] [195] 211; Nicaragua case. 107 Par 194. 24/37 never addressed. The point in time from which measures of self-defence against an armed attack may be taken remains unclear.
The Caroline case has been widely cited to answer this issue. This case has commonly been accepted as indicating when the customary law of selfdefence can be invoked. In terms of this case anticipatory self-defence is permitted when it can be shown that a "necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation" exists. 108 This case, however, represented the customary law prior to the existence of the Charter and it is unclear whether article 51 precludes the customary law in this regard and therefore precludes a right to anticipatory self-defence. This uncertainty stems from the inclusion of the term "inherent" in article 51. The prevailing view (and in the opinion of the author, correct view) is that, taking account of the objective of the Charter, article 51 excludes any self-defence other than that being launched in response to an armed attack. 109 It must be kept in mind that the customary right of self-defence is unclear and that its existence could even extend to the unilateral use of force by countries. The term "inherent" rather implies that the right of self-defence is also available to non-UN members.
Disagreement exists amongst international lawyers regarding the point in time from which self-defence may be invoked. 110 The more correct view is that anticipatory self-defence is not recognized by article 51. O'Connel http://www.asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf 8 and 11. She is of the opinion that: "a state need not wait to suffer the actual blow before defending itself, so long as it is certain the blow is coming". Concurring, Murswiek 2003 NJW 1016 -1018 25/37 for possible or potential threats that may occur in the future. Even the acceptance of a right to anticipatory self-defence based on the requirements of the Caroline case will not justify a right to pre-emptive defence. Pre-emptive defence relates to a hypothetical potential threat, which has not occurred or has not begun to occur. This scenario clearly exceeds the criteria of the Caroline case. The doctrine of pre-emptive strike is not recognized in terms of international public law and contravenes article 2(4).
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The pre-emptive strike doctrine is nothing more than offensive measures in disguise and does not adhere to the requirements of self-defence. Anarchy will be the result where other states follow the lead (and the doctrine) of the USA. States may decide that they do not trust other states which they regard as enemies and therefore invoke pre-emptive defence. This will undermine the international regime and will lead to a situation where force is an accepted mechanism of regulating international affairs. This was the view that was generally accepted by international lawyers in the nineteenth century when the distinction between bellum justum and bellum injustum was irrelevant. 112 The opinion exists that this acceptance: The USA has decreed a new doctrine through its acts where it may not only choose to impose pre-emptive force:
… when and where it chooses, but the nation will also punish those who engage in terror and aggression and will work to impose a universal moral clarity between good and evil."
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This pre-emptive defence will ultimately be employed to enforce good. 118 The Charter cannot be easily amended. In terms of a 103 the Charter for instance overrides all inconsistent treaties regardless of the date of their entry into force. A 108 of the Charter states that an amendment will come into force when it has been adopted by two thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in terms of their constitutional processes by two thirds of the members of the UN, which must include all the permanent members of the Security Council.
Conclusion
This article explored three instances where primarily the USA and UK used force against other states during the past ten years. The purpose of this investigation is to examine the legality of the coercive measures in order to ascertain the effects that these actions had in relation to article 2(4) of the 119 It must be noted that he USA did not rely on the notion of humanitarian intervention to justify its actions, but it rather stressed political and moral considerations in this regard. The concept of humanitarian intervention is something, which authors of international public law have focused on. In the pending case before the ICJ, the Legality of the Use of Force, the defendant states did not rely on the concept of humanitarian intervention. Only Belgium referred to past practice regarding humanitarian intervention.
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force is also an apology of power for the actions of the USA. The attacks against Afghanistan in response to the September 11 attacks are also debatable. The commonality that exists between the three cases, is the illegality attached to the actions of primarily the USA and the UK.
The failure of the Security Council to preserve peace implies that the United Nations has failed in the realization of one of its main objectives. The question is whether a solution could be found to ensure that the Security Council would propose that article 43 must be adhered to. Article 43 has never been utilized and it is not envisaged that it would ever become operational.
This would, however, not address the way in which article 27(3) determines the voting procedure of the Security Council, which makes provision for the right of a veto for a permanent member. This seems to be the main reason for members of the Security Council to act in the absence of authorization. The availability of armed forces to the Security Council would not solve this problem. It is most probable that the deployment of such a force would have been vetoed in the Kosovo case. This would also not have avoided the unilateral attack on Iraq, due to the lack of support for this action in the Security Council. The problem must be addressed at its source. Members can agree to an amendment of article 27 of the UN Charter, which will ensure a more efficient mechanism that could respond to threats of international peace.
It is, however, the opinion of the author that this would also not be an optimal 
